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Restitution in the Criminal Process:
Procedures for Fixing the Offender's
Liability
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 19821 represents an ambi-
tious attempt by Congress to bring restitution ideologically and practically
to the fore in the federal criminal process. Despite the extended authority
provided by the Act and the sweeping rhetoric accompanying it,' however,
there is reason to doubt whether the Act will accomplish its goal of "en-
sur[ing] that the Federal Government does all that is possible within lim-
its of available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without
1. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982). The new restitution provisions, § 5 of the Act, 96
Stat. at 1253-55, are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1982). In addition to the restitution sec-
tions, the Act requires the preparation of a "Victim Impact Statement" in every federal criminal case,
§ 3, 96 Stat. at 1249 (codified as FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)), strengthens criminal and civil protec-
tions of victims and witnesses against intimidation, § 4, 96 Stat. at 1249-53 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512-1515 (1982)), and requires the Attorney General to develop guidelines for the fair treatment
of crime victims and witnesses in the federal criminal justice system, § 6, 96 Stat. at 1256-57 (not
codified). The Department of Justice issued guidelines in compliance with the Act on July 9, 1983.
Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1983).
2. In Congressional debate, the Act was heralded by its principal co-sponsors as legislation which
"will do much to restore the faith of the American public in our system of justice," 128 CONG. RE
S11,435 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Laxalt), and as a measure "to begin the process
of rebalancing the scales of justice ... [to] insure that victims are given at least the rights now
afforded routinely to the accused," id. at SII,434 (statement of Sen. Heinz). Representative McCol-
lum described restitution as "the ultimate justice," id. at H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982); the Act
would make restitution "the expected norm, and no longer an afterthought," id. at S13,063 (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
Congress passed the Act with exceptional speed and bipartisan support. The Senate Judiciary
Committee reported S. 2420 favorably on August 19, 1982. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515. The Senate considered and passed S. 2420
on September 14, 1982. 128 CONG. Rac. S11,430-42 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982). On September 30,
1982, the House prematurely ended committee consideration of its version of the Act, H.R. 7191, and
considered and passed the bill. Id. at H8201-15 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982). On October 1, 1982, the
Senate passed the House version, but with further amendments of its own. Id. at S13,056-64 (daily
ed. Oct. 1, 1982). The House then approved this final version from the Senate. Id. at H8464-70
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982). President Reagan signed the Act into law on October 12, 1982, less than two
months after it left committee in the Senate. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, 1258 (1982).
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infringing on the constitutional rights of the defendant. .... ,' In adopt-
ing the statute, Congress failed to address an issue which is central to the
balance of the interests of victims and the rights of defendants-the ques-
tion of when in the criminal process the offender's liability to pay restitu-
tion should be fixed.
This Note examines that issue. The Note first describes the tension
between defendants' rights and victims' interests in compensation which is
created by linking the imposition of restitutionary liability to the technical
conviction which emerges from the adjudicatory phase of the criminal pro-
cess.4 The Note then examines two possible resolutions of this tension:
moving the liability decision from the adjudicatory to the sentencing phase
3. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 2(b)(2), 96 Stat. 1248, 1249
(1982).
The restitution sections of the Act have failed to pass constitutional muster in an early challenge.
United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (Act's denial of jury trial on
damages violates defendants' Seventh Amendment rights), appeal docketed, No. 83-7-444 (11th Cir.
Aug. 8, 1983). The court also held the restitution provisions unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment ("This is not 'fair'. This is not 'reasonable'. This is not 'due process'." Id. at 535.) and the
Fourteenth Amendment ("The probability of disparate results. . . is so great. . . that it is impossi-
ble to look forward to enough equality of application for the Act to comply with 'equal protection'."
Id.). The court did not go so far as to condemn as unconstitutional the longstanding practice of
determining restitutionary liability without a jury under the probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651
(1982). 568 F. Supp. at 534.
Some commentators have maintained that restitutionary liability is a species of civil liability and
that the criminal and civil processes are and should be conceptually and practically distinct. See Ep-
stein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in AssESSING THE CRIMINAL: RFsrrrurxON, RET-
RIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 231-57 (R. Barnett & J. Hagel eds. 1977). But see People v.
Heil, 79 Mich. App. 739, 748, 262 N.W.2d 895, 900 (1977) (criminal conviction does not necessarily
establish civil liability, but civil liability not necessary to impose restitution as condition of probation);
State v. Scherr, 9 Wis. 2d 418, 426, 101 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1960) (rejecting arguments based on "erro-
neous theory that determining the amount of restitution is a civil action to determine civil liability").
Epstein acknowledges, however, that there may be an overlap between the civil and criminal processes
within which restitution is appropriate. Epstein, supra, at 255-257. In fact, this area of overlap
includes all the cases to which restitution pertains-crimes which involve an identifiable, specific vic-
tim and which comprehend within their terms intentional torts. Within this area, a guilty verdict,
because it includes a finding of intentional conduct surpassing any civil standard of negligence, is a
proxy for the finding of restitutionary liability. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 620, 552 P.2d
97, 101, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 541 (1976) ("A judge may infer from a jury verdict of guilt in a theft
case that a defendant is liable to the crime victim.").
Congress limited application of the Act to Title 18 and air piracy offenses, thus excluding criminal
prosecutions under certain regulatory laws such as the antitrust and securities laws. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579(a)(1) (1982). Similarly, courts have refused to award restitution in cases where issues of caus-
ation are complicated by divergence between the intent involved in the offense and the nature of the
injury to the victim. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 247 Cal. App. 2d 394, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1966)
(disallowing condition requiring restitution of unpaid balance to credit card company when offense
committed was assault by cardholder on merchant who refused to honor card); People v. Becker, 349
Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957) (state cannot require driver convicted of leaving scene of accident
to make restitution to pedestrians injured in accident); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 3 A.2d 521
(1939) (same); cf. People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 282 N.W. 920 (1938) (upholding condition of
restitution imposed on driver convicted of negligent homicide in death of pedestrian; discussed exten-
sively in Becker).
4. The Note contrasts the "adjudicatory phase" with the "sentencing phase." The adjudicatory
phase includes the events preceding and including the final disposition of all charges either in a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere or in a verdict following a trial.
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or making an exception to the adjudicatory phase rule when the defendant
admits to restitutionary liability broader than the scope of the conviction.
From this examination, the Note concludes that restitutionary liability
must be imposed in the adjudicatory phase but that a more comprehensive
solution than the admissions exception is needed. The Note then refines
the adjudicatory phase approach by proposing changes in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure which would integrate restitution into the
pleading and plea bargaining stages of the criminal process.
I. THE ACT AND ITS POLICY
Under prior federal law,5 a court could order restitution only as a con-
dition of probation' and only "to aggrieved parties for actual damages or
loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had."'7 The Act ex-
pands this authority dramatically by abolishing the probation limitation
and by omitting-although without substantial comment-the restrictive
"offense of conviction" provision. 9 Federal courts now may order
5. Until passage of the Act, the authority to order restitution in federal cases was found in the
federal probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The Act did not repeal the portion of the proba-
tion statute relating to restitution, thus throwing into doubt whether probationary restitution contin-
ues to be governed by § 3651. The Act militates against giving continuing effect to the old provision
because the Act makes any restitution order entered by the sentencing court an automatic condition of
any probation granted, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(f(2), (g) (1982), thus subsuming the former authority in the
new provisions. Section 3651 remains available, however, as authority for ordering restitution in cases
involving crimes excluded from the coverage of the Act. A. PARTRIxE, A. CHAsET & W. ELDRIDGx,
THE SErENCING OPTIONS OF FEDERAL Dismiar JuDGEs 8 (rev. ed. 1983).
6. As in the federal statute, the probation limitation was common before approximately 1977 to
almost all jurisdictions where the authority to order restitution existed. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.1 (West Supp. 1983); MicH. Compu,. LAws ANN. § 771.3 (West Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:168-2 (West 1972) (repealed 1979); see Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in
Criminal Prosecution, 52 Mss. L.J. 515, 521 (1982). Since 1977, many states have enacted sentenc-
ing reforms which, like the Act, release restitution from the limitations of probation. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE §§ 15-18-65 to -77 (1982) (enacted 1980); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-603(C) (Supp. 1983)
(enacted 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089 (West 1981) (enacted 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-5-6 (Smith-Hurd 1982) (enacted 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:43-3, :44-2 (West 1982)
(enacted 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1979; amended 1981, 1983).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
8. The statute itself is no more specific than to allow restitution "to any victim of the offense." 18
U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982). The legislative history of the Act contains no indication, other than
citation of the language of the probation statute, S. Ra'. No. 532, supra note 2, at 30, reprinted in
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2536, that Congress appreciated the importance of the
specific language of the probation statute in determining how restitutionary liability is fixed. The
legislative history also contains no discussion of the approach to restitution taken in states without
"offense of conviction" provisions.
9. An "offense of conviction" provision requires that an order of restitution be based only on
offenses for which criminal guilt has been formally and finally adjudicated. Several state statutes also
contain such provisions. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-3 (West 1982) (restitution "shall not
exceed [victim's] loss"; "loss" defined as that "caused by the conduct constituting the offense by the
offender"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(3)(a) (Supp. 1983) (restitution limited to "offense of which
the defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted, or. . .any other criminal conduct admitted by the
defendant to the sentencing court").
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restitution "in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized
by law.""0
Two clear policies inform the use of restitution as a criminal sanction
under the Act. First, the Act advances restitution as a means of reparation
to victims11 rather than as a technique for rehabilitating offenders.1" This
shift in focus13 changes the standards by which restitution should be mea-
sured. If the aim of restitution were rehabilitative, the amount of restitu-
tion ordered should be commensurate with the offender's ability14 and
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982). Under the Act, a restitution order stands as an independent
component of the court's sentence and may be enforced by the United States or the victim "in the
same manner as a judgment in a civil action." Id. § 3579(h). The court may order restitution to be
paid immediately or in installments during a period of probation or during a period up to five years
following the expiration of a term of imprisonment. Id. § 3579(0. In addition, the Act provides that
any restitution order automatically becomes a condition of any term of probation or parole the of-
fender may serve as part of the court's sentence. Id. § 3579(g). The offender may be subject to revoca-
tion of parole or probation for failure to comply with the order of restitution. Id.
11. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated the premise of the restitution sections to be:
"[Wlhatever else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure
that the wrongdoer is required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of
well-being." S. REP. No. 532, supra note 2, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2536. The Committee associated the Act with the "revived effort at producing restitutive justice"
through "new methods at constructive, victim-oriented sentencing practices [that] can insure. . . that
the prosecutorial, judicial and probation authorities know, and are encouraged to respond to, the
victim's monetary damages." Id. at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2537.
12. The act of making restitution--especially when made in kind or by personal service-provides
the offender an opportunity for a cathartic recognition of wrongdoing and for symbolic expiation of
guilt. Eglash, Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for an Old Term, 48 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGy & PoucE Sci. 619, 622 (1958); Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional
Aim Modernized, 50 MINN. L. REv. 243, 249-50 (1965).
13. Although the Act stresses the needs of victims, it does not reject entirely the rehabilitative
potential of restitution. See 128 CONG. REC. H8201 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) ("'One who successfully makes restitution should have a positive sense of having earned a
fresh start and will have tangible evidence of his or her capacity to alter old behavior patterns and
lead a law-abiding life."' (quoting Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407
(1978))); S. REP. No. 532, supra note 2, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
2538 (Act allows alternative forms of restitution so that restitution can "both satisfy the victim and
provide maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender").
The Act also does not endorse all of the radical implications of restitutionary justice. Advocates of
the restitutionary theory of justice argue for a victim-oriented criminal law with restitution as its only
legitimate remedial objective. See Barnett & Hagel, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution,
and the Legal Process, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: REnTTiON, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL
PRocEss, supra note 3, at 1. Restitutionary justice de-emphasizes the violation of social norms in the
crime and focuses instead on the exchange between two individuals. Id. at 10. A crime produces an
imbalance of rights between the offender and the victim, and justice is served only when the transac-
tion is reversed by the act of restitution. Id. at 11, 26-27.
The premise of the Act is procedurally conservative, requiring that the basic principles of victim-
oriented restitution be served without "unduly complicat[ing] or prolong[ing] the sentencing process."
18 U.S.C. § 3579(d) (1982). The Act does not challenge the prosecutorial hegemony of the state by
affording a formal prosecutorial role to the victim. But see Barnett & Hagel, supra, at 12, 26 (restitu-
tionary justice implies absolute control of prosecution by victim). Nor does the Act establish restitution
as the exclusive criminal sanction. But cf. id. at 17-18, 24-25 (punitive or deterrent goals may be
served by restitution incidentally, but they cannot be legitimate ends of restitutionary justice system
accomplished by other types of sanctions).
44. The ability of the offender to pay restitution remains a factor to be considered by the sentenc-
ing court under the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982). Such a provision is necessary to avoid the
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willingness 5 to pay; it need not even approximately compensate the vic-
tim. In contrast, reparative restitution is measured strictly by the extent of
the victim's injury.16 To be just, the amount of restitution must compen-
sate the victim exactly.17
The second policy clearly articulated in the Act is that restitution
should be a priority of the criminal justice system.18 Reparative restitution
is to come before the government's interest in punishing or even rehabili-
tating the offender.1  Thus, the Act not only frees restitution from the
confines of probation but also elevates restitution to a status equal to or
above that held by the traditional punitive sanctions of imprisonment and
fines.
Unlike the policies of the Act, the procedures adopted by Congress to
advance restitution are unclear because of the ambiguous intent of Con-
gress in omitting the "offense of conviction" language from the new stat-
ute. Under the former statute, the "offense of conviction" provision linked
restitution to the technical offense of conviction; the final dismissal of a
constitutional defect produced when imprisonment results from the mere inability to pay restitution.
See Bearden v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 2064, 2073-74 (1983) (revocation of probation for failure to pay
fine and restitution reversed where court made no finding of lack of good faith effort by defendant to
pay amounts).
15. The offender's initiative is an important part of restitution's rehabilitative mission. See Eglash,
supra note 12, at 619, 620-21 (distinguishing "creative restitution" from reparation or indemnifica-
tion: restitution is necessarily voluntary while reparation and indemnification are compulsory and lack
restitution's rehabilitative potential).
16. See Barnett & Hagel, supra note 13, at 26-27. The theoretical justification for the measure of
damages is a separate issue from the question of what types of injuries will be compensated in any
particular system of restitution. The Act authorizes only certain types of damage awards to victims of
property offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(1) (1982), to victims who are injured physically, id. §
3579(b)(2), and to the estate of victims who are killed, id. § 3579(b)(3).
Congress restricted the Act to restitution orders where imposing restitution "will not unduly com-
plicate or prolong the sentencing process," id. § 3579(d), recognizing that the provision would exclude
from criminal restitution certain damages which could still be awarded in a civil action, 128 CONG.
REC. H8207 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982) (statement of Rep. McCollum). Congress decided that criminal
restitution should be limited to the victim's readily identifiable expenses and should not be extended to
include damages which are difficult to calculate, such as pain and suffering. See id. The original
Senate bill authorized recovery of lost income in the case of both homicide and physical injury not
resulting in death, S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301(a), 128 CONG. REc. Sl1,430, S11,432 (daily
ed. Sept. 14, 1982), but the version ultimately passed allows recovery only of income lost as a conse-
quence of an injury, 18 U.S.C. § 3579(b)(2) (1982). See also People v. Heil, 79 Mich. App. 739,
748-49, 262 N.W.2d 895, 900 (1977) ("[R]estitution for personal injury . . . generally should be
more limited in scope than civil damages.. . . [RIestitution should encompass only those losses which
are easily ascertained and measured, and which are a direct result of the defendant's criminal acts.").
17. Restitutionary justice places a premium on the fullness and exactness of restitution. Just as
incomplete compensation does not remedy fully the wrong committed, overcompensating the victim is
an injustice against the offender. Barnett & Hagel, supra note 13, at 13.
18. This priority is written into the Act in the requirement that the sentencing court state reasons
on the record if it does not order restitution or orders only partial restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2)
(1982). See also 128 CONG. Rac. S13,064 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1982) (statement of Sen. Laxalt) ("It is
the intent of Congress that judges order restitution in each and every case where the court finds there
has been property loss or injury to the victim.").
19. See supra note 11 (statement of Senate Judiciary Committee).
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charge before sentencing eliminated that charge as the basis for restitu-
tionary liability.2 0 Defendants developed specific expectations regarding
their exposure for restitution based on the outcome of the adjudicatory
phase. 1 The "offense of conviction" clause protected these expectations
and thus enabled defendants to plan their defense strategies before plead-
ing based on their estimates of their potential restitutionary liability.
At the same time, the "offense of conviction" regime threatened the ef-
fectiveness of restitution in providing complete compensation to victims
2
because the technical offense of conviction frequently fails to include the
full scope of the offender's conduct.2" This potential underinclusiveness
springs from two sources. First, compared to the finding of liability in a
collateral civil suit, a criminal conviction may be narrower because the
procedural rules-particularly evidentiary rules and the standard of
proof-are stricter in criminal law. Second, criminal convictions often do
not include aspects of the defendant's actual conduct, either because of a
prosecutorial decision not to charge a particular aspect of the offense or
because of a reduction or dismissal of counts in plea negotiations.
There are important distinctions between these two kinds of underin-
clusiveness. The second type of underinclusiveness is both more drastic
2'
20. In Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950), the
defendant was charged with seventeen counts of filing false statements on veterans' loan guarantees.
She was convicted on six counts and acquitted of two; nine counts were dismissed. The sentencing
court conditioned probation on payment of restitution to all seventeen victims named in the indictment
and to one other victim not named. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals modified the sentence, hold-
ing that the restitution condition could stand only as to the six counts of conviction. See United States
v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1940) (restitution condition limited to amount of loss
stated in indictment on which conviction was had); see also United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699,
701 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (in multicount indictment, restitution restricted to counts of convic-
tion); United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1982) (Karrell/Follelte principle is federal
majority rule); United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1008 (3d Cir. 1977) (following strict rule of
Follette).
21. United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1982) (defendant believed restitution could
not exceed amount in superseding indictment); see also State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 437, 416 A.2d
833, 840 (1980) ("Defendant reasonably believed that pursuant to the plea bargain and dismissal of
Count 3, the embezzlements were out of the case. Requiring restitution ...under Count 3 ...
would be manifestly unjust . . ").
22. In United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1981), Judge Miller acknow-
ledged that his restitution order exceeded the limits of the offense of conviction, but he defended the
order on the basis of public policy:
The court believes [a technical reading of the former statute invalidating the broad restitution
condition] to be unwarranted as it would be contrary to the goals of probation and would have
significant practical ramifications for both society and defendants.
[T]o permit a defendant who freely admits his or her guilt, and the amount of loss caused
thereby, to avoid making the aggrieved party at least economically whole is intolerable from a
societal perspective.
Id. at 912.
23. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 537.
24. Discretionary charging and plea bargaining eliminate whole aspects of the offense. Where an
offender has committed a series of discrete offenses against multiple victims, dismissal or failure to
charge some of the offenses will exclude certain victims from any recovery. If the offender has commit-
ted multiple offenses against a single victim-for example, a burglary causing property damage and a
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and less justified than the first kind of underinclusiveness because it is
grounded upon expediency unrelated to the victim's interest in recovering
reparations.25 These arbitrary exclusions under the former statute left vic-
tims with little or no compensation, despite the conviction of the offender
on related charges and despite the willingness of the sentencing court to
compensate the victim.
2 6
Courts thus face a dilemma in interpreting the Act. If courts abolish the
connection between the precise offense of conviction and the restitution
order, they will expose defendants to restitutionary liability bearing no
relation to the expectations which guided the defendants' defense strate-
gies. The adjudicatory phase would have little meaning in the sentencing
phase. But to perpetuate an unmodified "offense of conviction" constraint
will undercut the Act's intent to compensate victims as completely as pos-
sible. An interpretation of the Act is needed which preserves the function
of the adjudicatory phase in defining the liability of the defendant while
still permitting comprehensive responses to the injuries of victims.
II. THE CASE LAW AS EXPERIMENTATION
In balancing the right of defendants against the right of victims, federal
courts interpreting the Act may draw on the experience of federal and
state courts in implementing other restitution statutes. The case law
reveals two distinct approaches to resolving the tension between the inter-
ests of victims and offenders, each approach based on a different kind of
statute.27 Both approaches strike unsatisfactory balances.
subsequent assault resulting in physical injury-the failure to prosecute either charge to conviction
will limit the victim to partial recovery.
Compared with these exclusions, the effects of variations between the civil and criminal processes
on the scope of liability are more difficult to gauge. Although prosecutors must contend with stricter
procedural rules, they benefit from such features as extensive police resources for investigation and the
pressures on criminal defendants to plea bargain to avoid potentially severe sanctions.
25. Underinclusiveness associated with the strictness of rules of criminal procedure relative to civil
rules is an unavoidable consequence of the principle that the seriousness of criminal guilt and sanc-
tions warrants extraordinary procedural safeguards. Any attempt to relax procedural rules in the
criminal process to address this source of underinclusiveness will produce tension with this fundamen-
tal principle. By stating that the Act's solicitude to victims' interests is qualified by the need to avoid
infringing defendants' rights, supra pp. 505-06, Congress resolved any such tensions in favor of pre-
serving procedural protections in the criminal process.
26. There is no reason to believe, for example, that in Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950), the government's case as to any one of the seventeen victims
named in the indictment was significantly stronger than its case with respect to any other victim; yet
because eleven counts were dismissed, only six of the seventeen victims were awarded restitution. The
case similarly does not explain why charges were not brought with respect to an eighteenth victim,
who also received no restitution.
27. For comparative discussions of various state statutes, see People v. Williams, 247 Cal. App. 2d
394, 404-09, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557-60 (1966); People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 617-19,
223 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1974), leave denied, 393 Mich. 766 (1974); State v. Bausch, 171 N.J. Super.
314, 319-21, 408 A.2d 1085, 1087-88 (App. Div. 1979), modified, 83 N.J. 425, 416 A.2d 833 (1980).
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A. Shifting the Liability Decision: The Sentencing Phase Approach
In states without specific "offense of conviction" provisions, 28 the court
can fix a defendant's restitutionary liability in the sentencing phase with-
out being bound by the outcome of the adjudicatory phase.2" This ap-
proach attempts to address both sources of underinclusiveness. First, the
court is free to apply more liberal evidentiary rules in the sentencing
phase ° and to fashion a special standard of proof to govern the trans-
planted determination of liability.31 Second, because the court's determina-
tion is de novo, it is, at least in theory, not restricted by the technical
offense of conviction. The court may consider charges that have been ex-
cluded from the indictment or dismissed in a plea agreement. In some
cases, the court can even effectively re-try the defendant on charges of
which he was acquitted at trial.3
2
The courts of these "nonrestrictive" states most often justify this au-
thority by asserting that probation is a matter of grace, not of right.33 The
28. For examples of nonrestrictive state statutes, see ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-603(C) (Supp.
1983) ("restitution. . . in such an amount and manner as the court may order"); CAL. PENiAL CODE
§ 1203.1 (West Supp. 1983) (probation conditions must be "reasonable" and "fitting and proper to
the end that justice may be done [and] that amends may be made. . . for any injury. . . resulting
from . . . [the] breach [of the law]"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1982)
("[riestitution . . . not to exceed the actual out of pocket expenses or loss to the victim proximately
caused by the conduct of the defendant"); MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 771.3(2)(d) (West Supp.
1983) ("restitution to the victim"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 973.09(lm)(a), (8)(a) (West Supp. 1983)
("not in excess of the pecuniary loss caused by the offense"; "pecuniary loss" defined as "damages
. . . arising out of the facts or events constituting the probationer's criminal activities").
29. See, e.g., People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 487, 541 P.2d 545, 549, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909
(1975) (allowing restitution condition based on count on which defendant was acquitted after trial
because "additional circumstances were developed in the unusually prolonged probation hearing");
People v. Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich. App. 100, 103-04, 273 N.W.2d 602, 604 (1978) (per curiam) (quot-
ing transcript of inadequate sentencing hearing; remanded for further hearing on liability for bad
checks not included in offense of conviction).
30. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1949).
31. See, e.g., People v. Pettit, 88 Mich. App. 203, 207, 276 N.W.2d 878, 881 (1979) ("persuasive
support in the record"); State v. Harris, 70 N.J. 586, 599, 362 A.2d 32, 38-39 (1976) ("factual basis"
in New Jersey; discussing other state statutes).
32. People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975); cf. People v.
Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 552 P.2d 97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1976) (restitution condition following
acquittal not allowed; Lent distinguished as involving extraordinary sentencing hearing). Contra Peo-
pie v. Winquest, 115 Mich. App. 215, 320 N.W.2d 346 (1982) (restitution cannot be based on crime
for which defendant was tried and acquitted).
33. See People v. Williams, 247 Cal. App. 2d 394, 399-400, 403-04, 55 Cal. Rptr. 550, 554,
556-57 (1966); People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich. App. 613, 620, 223 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1974), leave
denied, 393 Mich. 766 (1974).
The Supreme Court has described probation as "a period of grace [granted] in order to aid the
rehabilitation of a penitent offender." Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932). "Probation is
thus conferred as a privilege and cannot be demanded as a right." Id. Lower federal courts have not
applied the grace rationale in conditioning probation on restitution, however, because the restitution
authority derived from a specific provision of the probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). See
United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 954 (E.D. Pa. 1940) ("I think it clear that this general
language is limited by the later specific provision so far as restitution is concerned."). But see United
States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1983) (reading general opening sentence of § 3651
as broadening more specific restitution phrase of statute).
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defendant, in this view, voluntarily accepts the offered terms of probation
in a kind of contract with the state. He is free to opt for the imposition of
a non-probationary sentence if he feels the conditions are excessive or too
onerous.3
This rationale is inadequate for the purposes of the Act for three rea-
sons. First, its basic premise is faulty. The defendant, faced with probable
imprisonment and with a judge who may react severely to his rejection of
the court's offer of leniency, is unlikely to reject probation except to avoid
the most extreme conditions.35 Second, even if the defendant's choice were
a real one, leaving the victim's recovery to the .option of the offender is
antithetical to the use of restitution to serve the needs of victims.3' Third,
the grace rationale allows only for probationary restitution. A more coher-
ent rationale is needed once restitution is removed from the courts' tradi-
tionally expansive probationary authority.
Like the probationary approach founded on the grace rationale, "real
offense" sentencing creates a secondary liability decision in the sentencing
phase, but "real offense" sentencing applies beyond the context of proba-
tion.37 Under this approach, the sentencing judge may draw informal con-
clusions about what constitutes the "real offense" committed by the defen-
dant, without regard to the technical offense found by formal conviction.,
The sentence imposed reflects the severity of this "real offense," thus cor-
recting for the potentially incomplete or arbitrary results of the adjudica-
34. See People v. Cummings, 120 Ariz. 69, 71, 583 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Ct. App. 1978); People v.
Good, 287 Mich. 110, 115-16, 282 N.W. 920, 923 (1938).
35. See People v. Richards, 17 Cal. 3d 614, 619, 552 P.2d 97, 100, 131 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540
(1976) ("defendant is in effect required to choose between accepting incarceration and righting a
wrong he may not in fact have committed"); People v. Becker, 349 Mich. 476, 482, 84 N.W.2d 833,
836 (1957) (to say defendant has a choice "begs the question" because not every alternative is lawful);
State v. Reedeker, 534 P.2d 1240, 1241 (Utah 1975) (sentence is "akin to an alternative to pay up
something not found in the record or be imprisoned for debt").
36. Leaving restitution to the willingness of the defendant to accept it as a condition of probation
is analogous to giving the prosecutor and defendant absolute power over whether to include restitution
in plea agreements. See infra note 50.
37. L. WuiuNs, J. KREss, D. GoTTFREDsoN, J. C,,,iN & A. GELA,, SrNcING GUME-
LwNEs: STRuCrRING JuDiCIAL DrIRIoN 26-27 (1978); Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMIoLOGY 1550, 1561-80 (1981) (criti-
cizing real offense sentencing as attempt to sidestep substantive criminal law and procedural protec-
tions of the adjudicatory phase).
38. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (sentencing judge may consider defendant's
false testimony at trial in imposing sentence); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (sentencing
judge may consider information concerning unadjudicated crimes not admissible at trial).
A variation of "real offense" sentencing exists in the decisionmaking authority of the United States
Parole Commission. In determining the period of incarceration an offender should serve before release
on parole, the Commission rates the severity of the offense based on information from various sources,
including the pre-sentence investigation report. 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) (1982). The Commission resolves
disputes by the preponderance of the evidence standard, and it may "consider in any determination,
charges upon which a prisoner was found not guilty after trial [if] reliable information is presented
that was not introduced into evidence at such trial (e.g., a subsequent admission or other clear indica-
tion of guilt)." Id.
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tory phase. The technical offense of conviction does, however, still deter-
mine the maximum sentence that the court may impose.3' Through this
link, the expectations of punishment which guide the defendant in plead-
ing and in preparing his defense are protected from uncontrolled expan-
sion at the time of sentencing.'
0
Real offense sentencing fails, however, when applied to restitution. The
amount of restitution is directly related to the offense causing injury to a
victim,41 and therefore the entire offense is needed as a basis for a restitu-
tion order which will compensate the victim for the entire injury suffered.
By comparison, real offense sentencing rests on the premise that convic-
tion of only a part of the "real offense" can establish exposure to a quan-
tum of punitive sanctions considered to reflect adequately the severity of
the entire "real offense."'42 This premise cannot be reconciled with the
logical framework of restitution, in which the offense and liability are
linked to the amount of restitution ultimately ordered .4  Real offense sen-
tencing therefore is not an answer to the underinclusiveness of the techni-
cal offense of conviction.
B. The "Offense of Conviction" Response: Informal Bargaining for
Restitution
In other jurisdictions, the existence of statutory "offense of conviction"
provisions has forced courts to confront more directly the tension between
defendants' need for protection of their expectations regarding restitution
and the need to obtain restitution awards which cover the full scope of the
offense committed. These courts have recognized that the strictest reading
of the "offense of conviction" provision would lead to a procedural re-
39. "A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task urthin
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punishment after the
issue of guilt has been determined." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (emphasis
added).
40. For example, consider a defendant charged with five counts of an offense carrying a statutory
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine. In total, the defendant faces the
possibility of 25 years in prison and a $50,000 fine. If he is convicted of just two of the counts, real
offense sentencing holds that he may be sentenced on the basis of the judge's view that he in fact
committed all five offenses, but because there are just two formal counts of conviction, he may be
sentenced to no more than 10 years in prison and a $20,000 fine.
41. Each count of an indictment carries its own quantum of restitution depending on the facts of
the offense alleged in the count.
42. Real offense sentencing is effective only if the statutory maximum sentence prescribed by the
legislature for any given offense is higher than the normal sentence given for that offense alone. Thus,
in a system of mandatory sentences, real offense sentencing would fail because the state could never
build up, on the basis of a few counts, a margin of exposure within which to vary the exact sentence
imposed.
43. To demonstrate this failure, consider the hypothetical situation described in note 40, supra,
with the additional loss of $1000 to a victim associated with each of the five counts. Once the offense
of conviction is pared down to just two counts, the basis for restitution of the full $5000 in actual
damages is irretrievably lost. The amount of restitution could not exceed $2000.
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quirement of prospective notice to the defendant of his liability for a spe-
cific amount of restitution if he were convicted of the count as alleged."
At the same time, courts have seen that such a rigid requirement would
cripple the effectiveness of restitution as a means of compensating vic-
tims.45 Confronted with this dilemma, the "offense of conviction" courts
have sought to increase the flexibility of the rule rather than to impose a
rigid requirement of binding advance notice."
The most common approach in "offense of conviction" jurisdictions has
been to fashion an exception to the rule when the defendant admits his
obligation to make restitution.'7 The admissions exception in effect creates
an intermediate level of pleading where the defendant can concede his
restitutionary liability without formally confessing criminal guilt. The
scope of admitted restitutionary liability thus can be broader than the
criminal liability represented by the offense of conviction. 4'8 The most im-
portant consequence of the admissions exception is that it allows for the
insertion of restitution into the plea bargaining calculus. In return for the
44. In United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940), the court held that the specifi-
cation in the indictment of an amount of alleged embezzlement placed an upper bound on the restitu-
tion condition imposed. In arriving at this holding, Judge Maris analogized the restitution limitation
to the requirement that a sentencing court stay within the statutory maximum when imposing a fine.
Id. at 955. By simple extension, the analogy contemplates a requirement that the indictment include
prospective, quantified notice to the defendant of his exposure to restitution.
45. See supra note 22.
46. United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962), although
a confused and sometimes contradictory opinion, is a pivotal case in the movement toward flexibility
and away from the strict "offense of conviction" rule. Taylor was convicted on all counts of two
indictments charging tax evasion and failure to file tax returns. The sentencing court imposed a resti-
tution condition covering tax liabilities for periods not included in the indictments. Although the
Fourth Circuit panel expressed its "substantial agreement" with United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp.
953 (E.D. Pa. 1940), and United States v. Karrell, 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
891 (1950), in striking down the broad restitution condition, it instructed the district court that on
remand it could "properly require, as a condition of probation, payment of those taxes reported by the
defendant as due for [years not included in the indictment] since such liability is admitted. . . ." 305
F.2d at 187.
47. In United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1981), the court cited three
factors supporting its authority to condition probation on full restitution:
(1) the amount of loss suffered by an identifiable aggrieved party is certain; (2) the defendant
admits, and there is no factual question as to whether, the defendant caused or was responsible
for the aggrieved party's loss; and (3) the defendant consents, freely and voluntarily, to make
full restitution and that it be a condition of probation.
512 F. Supp. at 908; see also Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 194-95 (9th Cir. 1982) (quot-
ing from and endorsing McLaughlin).
In some "offense of conviction" states, the admissions exception has been codified. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 15-18-66(1) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(3)(a) (Supp. 1983).
48. In a few unusual cases, federal courts have upheld restitution conditions reaching beyond the
scope of the offense of conviction or even beyond the limits of the indictment, even though the defen-
dant did not agree to the extensions of liability. See United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1053-54
(7th Cir. 1982) (negotiated guilty plea to two counts of multicount, multidefendant indictment; defen-
dant and prosecutor "agreed to disagree on the amount" of restitution; condition included amount in
excess of offense of conviction); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 1, 1-2 (7th Cir. 1979) (conviction
on all counts of indictment involving fifty victims; restitution condition imposed encompassed full $1.7
million scheme and over 34,000 victims).
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defendant's admission to restitutionary liability that is broader than the
potential liability under the offense of conviction, the prosecutor can re-
duce the defendant's exposure to punitive sanctions by accepting a guilty
plea to fewer counts of the indictment.
The chief shortcoming of the existing admissions exception is its lack of
structure. Under the current system, the defendant's admission may be
intentional or unintentional and may occur at any point in the criminal
process."9 Ironically, the very bargaining process spawned by the admis-
sions exception as part of the response to the rigidity of the "offense of
conviction" rule itself requires strict enforcement of that limitation. De-
fendants and prosecutors will bargain for restitution only if there exists a
structure which ensures each side the benefit of its bargain. What is lack-
ing is a way for the defendant to plead his restitutionary liability formally




The restitution case law shows the need to develop the law in conjunc-
tion with the Act on two levels. On a fundamental level, the experience of
state courts not restricted by "offense of conviction" provisions demon-
49. United States v. McMichael, 699 F.2d 193, 194 (4th Cir. 1983) (amount agreed to during
recess in sentencing hearing); United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing
condition based on alleged admission included in presentence report); United States v. Landay, 513
F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1975) (admission found in civil consent judgment between victim bank and
defendant after date of pleading); United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D. Md.
1981) (admission as part of plea agreement); see also State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 430, 416 A.2d
833, 836 (1980) (admission found in statement made to police before prosecution was begun).
50. Recent cases provide the first appellate review of attempts to use restitution strategically in
plea bargaining. In the Ninth Circuit, the mutuality of the bargain determines whether the "offense of
conviction" limitation will be applied strictly. Compare Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th
Cir. 1982) (defendant's agreement that scope of guilty plea will not limit restitution in effect waives
application of "offense of conviction" rule) with United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982)
(distinguishing Phillips because here defendant did not agree to restitution and applying "offense of
conviction" rule strictly). In Orr, strict application of the "offense of conviction" provision reduced the
amount of restitution from $3715 to $200, an effect the defendant apparently planned when she got
the agreement of the prosecutor to file a superseding indictment much narrower than the original
indictment. 691 F.2d at 432.
The Second Circuit has not looked as kindly on defendants' attempts to limit their liability through
plea agreements. In United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1979), the defendants attempted
unsuccessfully to obtain a promise from the judge that the amount of restitution would be limited to
$100,000. When restitution in excess of $2.5 million was ordered, they argued that they should be
allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas. The court rejected this argument, holding that their expecta-
tion of limited restitution was unreasonable. Id. at 35.
The New Jersey Supreme Court looked more sympathetically on the defendant's strategic pleading
in State v. Bausch, 83 N.J. 425, 416 A.2d 833 (1980). Bausch claimed that he pleaded guilty to two
charges of breaking and entering to gain dismissal of a third embezzlement charge because the embez-
zlement count carried the possibility of a much greater amount of restitution. Id. at 429-30, 416 A.2d
at 833. The court accepted the argument, persuaded by the fact that the breaking and entering
charges were high misdemeanors (felonies) while the embezzlement count was only a misdemeanor,
and invalidated the restitution condition covering all three charges. Id. at 437, 416 A.2d at 840.
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strates the need for some version of the "offense of conviction" link to the
adjudicatory phase. When courts impose restitutionary liability during the
sentencing phase-whether according to the grace rationale of probation
or "real offense" sentencing-defendants are not adequately protected
against restitution orders reaching arbitrarily and unexpectedly beyond
the scope of the conviction found formally in the adjudicatory phase. On a
more particular level, courts' experience with "offense of conviction" stat-
utes shows the need to refine the procedural structure of the adjudicatory
phase to establish a basis for more comprehensive restitution orders.
Legislative reform is not necessary to maintain the "offense of convic-
tion" limitation; the restriction is consonant with the legislative history
and policies of the Act and can be supplied by judicial construction.51 Be-
cause of its role in protecting defendants' rights, an "offense of conviction"
rule is supported-even dictated-by the general policy of the Act that the
victims' interests should not be promoted to the detriment of the rights of
defendants. Furthermore, locating the liability decision in the adjudicatory
phase advances restitution as a priority of the criminal justice system. Im-
position of restitutionary liability during the adjudicatory phase-the
same time that the court determines liability for punitive sanc-
tions-creates a parallel procedural structure which lends legitimacy and
coherence to restitution as a sanction. Restitutionary liability fixed at the
time of sentencing is precisely the "afterthought" that Congress con-
demned when it enacted the legislation. 2 Making restitution a concern in
the adjudicatory phase as well as at the time of sentencing will force
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to consider the importance of res-
titution throughout the criminal process.
Preserving the "offense of conviction" rule locates the imposition of
restitutionary liability in the adjudicatory phase generally. The imposition
of restitutionary liability must be integrated specifically into a defendant's
pleading. Congress or the Court should therefore amend Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rule governing pleading hear-
ings, in four ways.
51. "Although the language of the new statute is not identical to that of the probation statute,
these precedents [cases interpreting the "offense of conviction" language of 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982)]
may have relevance for the new law as well as the old." A. PARTRIDGE, A. CHASE- & W. ELDRIDGE,
supra note 5, at 9.
52. The Senate Judiciary Committee deplored the fact that "federal criminal courts have gone the
way of their state counterparts, reducing restitution from being an inevitable if not exclusive sanction
to being an occasional afterthought." S. REP. No. 532, supra note 2, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2536.
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A. Amendments to the Federal Rules
First, Congress should require the court to notify the defendant in open
court, before he enters a plea, that the court may order restitution for any
count of the indictment that results in a conviction or formal admission of
liability.5" This basic notice requirement applies to restitution the same
procedures as are now required for fines and imprisonment." Unlike the
notice requirement for punitive sanctions, however, the amendment would
not require that the notice include a quantified upper bound on the poten-
tial amount of restitution. Nor would it require that the prosecutor allege
in the indictment the amount of loss caused by the offense. Specific notice
is unnecessary because the factual description contained in the indictment
provides the defendant with adequate notice of both the nature and the
magnitude of the alleged injury.55 A specific notice requirement might un-
duly restrict restitution orders because ascertaining the exact amount of
loss often requires factual development which only rarely will have been
completed before the defendant enters his plea.
A second revision to Rule 11 would authorize the court to accept a plea
of guilty with the binding condition that the only sanction to be imposed
on that count will be restitution."8 This plea of "guilty for restitution"
53. Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended by adding the
following italicized provisions:
RULE 11. PLEAS
(c) ADVICE TO DEFENDANT
Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum
penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law,
including the effect of any special parole term; and
(2) that he may be required to pay restitution to the victim or victims of any offense to
which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere; and ....
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); see also Department of Justice, Implementation of Restitution
Provisions of Victim-Witness Protection Act of 1982, at 16 (unpublished internal policy statement)
("The position of the Department of Justice is that a statement by the court that full restitution may
be ordered should be added to the information provided to a defendant under Rule 11.").
55. An upper bound on the amount of restitution is built into this factual description because the
court has no discretion in determining the amount of damages flowing from a particular act. See
People v. Heil, 79 Mich. App. 739, 748, 262 N.W.2d 895, 900 (1977) (holding restitution condition
"essentially arbitrary" when amount not based directly on victim's loss).
If the factual description of the offense contained in the indictment provides insufficient notice, the
defendant may request a bill of particulars. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(0; 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 130 (1982).
56. Rule 11(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended by adding the
following italicized provisions:
RULE 11. PLEAS
(e) PLEA AGREEMENT PROCEDURE
(1) IN GENERAL The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defen-
dant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward
reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to
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would be similar to the admission of restitutionary liability currently cog-
nizable in less formal terms under the admissions exception.57 The
amendment would create a mechanism for formally incorporating restitu-
tion into the bargaining process. Under this provision, the court could im-
pose traditional sanctions on only a few counts of an indictment while
preserving the integrity of the entire indictment for the purposes of
restitution. 8
To counter the danger that restitution will be treated as merely another
element to be raised or lowered in plea negotiations, a third amendment
would require the court, before dismissing any count pursuant to a plea
agreement, to inquire whether any potential restitutionary liability at-
taches to the count.59 To acquiesce in a dismissal, the court would have to
a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will
do any of the following:
(A) with leave of the court as provided in subsection (e)(3) of this rule, move for
dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation that restitution will be the only sanction imposed on a
particular charge, with the understanding that upon acceptance of the plea agreement
by the court such recommendation shall be binding upon the court; or
(C) [current subsection (B)]; or
(D) [current subsection (C)].
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
For the text of proposed Rule 11(e)(3), see infra note 59.
57. The proposed amendment does not change the range of alternative pleas in FED. R. CRsM. P.
11(a). The "guilty for restitution" plea is technically a plea of guilty or noo contendere. Its unique
feature is the attachment of the agreement that the prosecutor will move under proposed Rule
11(e)(1)(B) for a binding condition that restitution will be the only consequence of the guilty plea to
the particular count.
58. Consider a hypothetical situation in which the defendant has been indicted on three counts of
mail fraud, each involving a different victim. Each count carries a maximum penalty of five years
imprisonment and/or a $1000 fine. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Count 1 involves a fraud of $1000;
count 2, $2500; and count 3, $5000. Under the proposed rule, the defendant could plead guilty to
count 1 with no agreement as to sentencing disposition and guilty to counts 2 and 3 with an agree-
ment pursuant to proposed Rule 11(e)(1)(B) that the disposition of those counts will be limited to
restitution. The effect of this agreement would be to leave the defendant exposed to a five-year prison
term and $1000 fine under count I and to the total restitutionary amount of $8500 under all three
counts. The defendant has gained a decrease in his exposure to punitive sanctions from 15 years and
$3000 to 5 years and $1000. The government has gained a complete restitution order while retaining
for the court the flexibility to impose a sentence with some punitive sanctions.
59. Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended by adding the
following new subsection (3) and renumbering current subsections (3)-(6):
(3)(A) The court shall not accept an agreement requiring the dismissal of any charges with-
out first inquiring of the attorney for the government in open court whether he has considered
the defendant's possible liability to pay restitution arising from those charges.
(B) The court shall accept such an agreement only upon a finding stated on the record:
(i) that the charges to be dismissed do not give rise to any possible liability to pay
restitution; or
(ii) that there is no factual basis for the charges to be dismissed; or
(iii) that a compelling reason exists which justifies dismissal of the charges despite'
the existence of a factual basis for them and possible restitutionary liability.associated
with them.
If the court finds a compelling reason under subsection (iii) of this section, it shall state the
reason or reasons on the record.
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state on the record that there is no factual basis for the charge, that the
charge does not give rise to any restitutionary liability, or that a compel-
ling reason requires dismissal of the charge in derogation of the victim's
interest in restitution.60 For example, a court could dismiss a count only if
successful prosecution of the count were unlikely because the victim or
another witness is unable or unwilling to testify or if the victim's need for
restitution had been satisfied by compensation through collateral proceed-
ings.61 By excluding expediency from legitimate bases for dismissal of a
charge, the use of restitution in plea bargaining would be harnessed to the
sole purpose of broadening the scope of restitution orders.
This third amendment parallels the Act's requirement that the court
state reasons on the record at the time of sentencing if it either does not
order restitution or orders only partial restitution. 2 But the proposed rule
would be more effective than the statutory provision in increasing the use
of restitution. It would give restitution priority before liability is deter-
mined rather than leaving consideration of restitution until it is too late to
alter the outcome of the adjudicatory phase. Putting the court's required
inquiry at this stage allows the court to direct the case from its early
stages to ensure complete restitution.
The court would be aided in its inquiry under this proposed rule by a
pre-pleading "Statement of Restitutionary Liability" from the prosecu-
tor.6" In this statement, the prosecutor would identify the victims of the
60. See supra note 59. This requirement would prevent the prosecutorial maneuvering that oc-
curred in United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982). In Orr, the prosecutor agreed with the
defendant to file a superseding indictment which greatly reduced the victims' restitutionary recovery.
But see Department of Justice, Implementation of Restitution Provisions of Victim-Witness Protection
Act of 1982, at 8 (unpublished internal policy statement) (recommending pro-victim strategy of having
defendant plead to superseding indictment which states his total restitutionary liability to all victims).
61. Compensation of the victim from another source can justify accepting a plea agreement only if
the compensation amounts to restitution accomplished collaterally, that is, only if the compensation
has come from the offender. This will occur, for example, in the rare case when a civil suit by the
victim has proceeded to judgment before pleading in the criminal case or when the offender has settled
his restitutionary obligations voluntarily.
The Act provides that restitution shall not be ordered if the victim has received compensation from
another source, except that, "in the interest of justice," the court may order restitution to be paid to
one who has compensated the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(1) (1982). The Senate Report identifies
such third parties as including "friends, family members, or other individuals and organizations...
as well as insurance companies and state victim compensation programs." S. REP. No. 532, supra
note 2, at 33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2539.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982). The required statement of reasons at the time of pleading does
not supplant the statutorily required statement of reasons at the time of sentencing because reasons of
a different sort may be applicable at the time of sentencing. At sentencing, the court must weigh
considerations such as the ability of the offender to pay restitution in arriving at a final restitution
order. 18 U.S.C. § 3580 (1982). The sentencing reasons thus may include those reasons of "practical
necessity [for] limiting both the amount of restitution ordered and the period during which restitution
payments are ordered to be made." S. REP. No. 532, supra note 2, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2538.
63. The following should be added as FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.1:
Rule 11.1. Statement of Restitutionary Liability
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alleged offense and estimate the extent of the injury to each in monetary
terms. This information would be correlated to the indictment by count,
but the estimates would be purely informational; it would not bind the
prosecutor or the court in imposing restitution. The prosecutor would also
identify the sources of this information and verify under oath that he has
interviewed the victims and investigated their restitutionary needs. The
requirement of this statement parallels the Act's requirement of a "Victim
Impact Statement" from the probation department before sentencing."
B. The Roles of the Judge and Prosecutor
Each of these revisions to the Federal Rules places on the judge an
expanded duty to inform, inquire, or approve. Because the Act aims to
bring restitution into the criminal process as a fundamental principle, re-
sponsibility for protecting that principle should be vested primarily in the
judge-the symbolic center of the criminal justice system. In addition,
there are practical reasons for stressing the role of the court. Expanded
restitution will require advocacy of restitution as a principle as well as
close monitoring of plea negotiations. The judge is better suited to these
roles than is the prosecutor because she is not a direct participant in plea
bargaining.
Significantly, the proposal does not create in the prosecutor a formal
duty to be the victim's advocate.6 5 Still, the prosecutor will bear much of
the burden of advancing the use of restitution. Vigorous advocacy of resti-
tution by judges will require prosecutors to adapt their practices in charg-
ing and bargaining to yield negotiated results acceptable to the court.
Early in the investigation, the prosecutor will have to determine the im-
portance of each count in terms of restitution."6 When negotiating, the
(a) Before the time of pleading, the attorney for the government shall submit to the court
and to the attorney for the defendant a statement containing a list of the victim or victims
injured by the offense alleged in each count of the indictment and an estimate in monetary
terms of the extent of the injury to each victim from each alleged offense.
(b) This statement shall include disclosure of the sources of the information contained in it.
(c) In this statement, the attorney for the government shall affirm under oath that he has
interviewed or reasonably attempted to interview each victim of the alleged offenses and that
he has investigated diligently their restitutionary needs.
(d) Nothing in this statement shall limit any order of restitution or otherwise bind the court
or the attorney for the government.
64. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
65. For proposals that victims be given a formal role in criminal prosecutions, either through
personal representatives or through the imposition of a duty on public prosecutors to represent their
interests, see Goldstein, supra note 6, at 547-60.
66. See Department of Justice, Implementation of Restitution Provisions of Victim-Witness Pro-
tection Act of 1982, at 3 (unpublished internal policy statement) ("It is now even more important to
identify all victims of a crime early in the investigative stage and to collect necessary information
about their losses. . . ."). Under this Note's proposal, this investigation would have to culminate in
the required "Statement of Restitutionary Liability." See supra note 63.
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prosecutor will have to avoid bargaining away restitutionary counts and
determine, in light of the ultimate restitution order, how much punish-
ment is appropriate." The position is one of partial discretion: the prose-
cutor retains his traditional authority with respect to punitive sanctions,
but he must work under sharply limited discretion with respect to
restitution.
CONCLUSION
In the Act, Congress clearly articulated the popular will that the crimi-
nal process should serve the needs of victims. There is no need, however,
to accomplish this reform at a high cost to the rights of defendants and to
the integrity of the process. These proposals aim to transform the policy of
the Act into a workable process. By relatively simple means-the exten-
sion of the "offense of conviction" principle and amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure-this proposal serves the goals of the
Act by striking the best balance between the rights of defendants and the
needs of victims.
-Lawrence P. Fletcher
67. While it falls on the sentencing court to determine the actual sentence imposed, the prosecutor,
early in the case, makes a similar judgment when he decides what will be the parameters of the
government's bargaining position.
In addition to its rehabilitative and deterrent potential, see Schafer, supra note 12, at 248-50,
restitution has the virtue of neutralizing the offense in logical terms. The injury to the victim is
"undone" by complete restitution, allowing the court to impose punitive sanctions focused more accu-
rately on addressing the element of harm to society in the offense.
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